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Can Gambling Increase Savings?   
Empirical Evidence on Prize-linked Savings Accounts 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the adoption and impact of prize-linked savings (PLS) accounts, which offer random, 
lottery-like payouts to individual account holders in lieu of interest. Using micro-level data from a bank 
offering these products in South Africa, we show that a PLS product was attractive to a broad group of 
individuals, across all age, race, and income levels.  Financially-constrained individuals and those with no 
other deposit accounts were particularly likely to open a PLS account.  Participants in the PLS program 
increased their total savings on average by 1% of annual income, a 38% increase from the mean level of 
savings.  Deposits in PLS did not appear to cannibalize same-bank savings in standard savings products.  
Instead, PLS appears to serve as a substitute for lottery gambling.  Exploiting the random assignment of 
prizes, we also present evidence that prize winners increase their investment in PLS, sometimes by more 
than the amount of the prize won, and that large prizes generate a local “buzz” which lead to an 11.6% 
increase in demand for PLS at a winning branch. 
1 
I. Introduction 
    Personal savings serve as the first available buffer for households when faced with job loss, 
healthcare costs, or other financial shocks.  However, recent evidence suggests that a large percentage of 
households maintain little to no savings, despite potentially high returns to saving (Dupas and Robinson 
2013) and significant costs of financial fragility (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011; FDIC 2012).  In 
light of this, economists and policymakers have investigated many proposals and products aimed at 
encouraging higher savings rates (see Tufano & Schneider 2008, for an overview of policy proposals).  
One such proposal is the usage of prize-linked savings (PLS) products, which provide participants the 
chance to win prizes by saving money, typically in a lottery-like setting.  While PLS programs have 
existed for hundreds of years and are prevalent around the world, they have only recently begun to receive 
academic attention.
1
  Using micro-level data from a PLS program run by one of the largest banks in South 
Africa, this paper demonstrates that PLS accounts can attract new individuals into the banking system and 
significantly increase overall savings rates, particularly for individuals with low initial savings. 
PLS accounts differ from standard savings accounts in that they offer individual savers a 
stochastic, heavily-skewed return as opposed to a predetermined interest rate.  Depositors in a PLS 
account are entered periodically into a drawing in which their chance at winning a potentially large prize 
(or smaller prizes) is a function of the amount they have deposited.  In aggregate, all savers receive a total 
amount of prizes (interest payments) that may approximate market rates, but this lottery-like system 
changes the payoff structure for saving, adding an element of risk and, possibly, excitement to holding 
money in the account.   
While the payment of prizes is random, PLS differs from regular lottery gambling by protecting 
all principal invested.  When a consumer places funds in a PLS account, she has access to those funds 
either on demand or at a future date, and so in this sense she is gambling only with the potential interest 
payments.  In contrast, the principal “invested” in a lottery ticket is only preserved if the buyer happens to 
                                                                
1
 Recent papers on PLS include Guillén and Tschoegl (2002), Tufano (2008), Kearney et al. (2010), Atalay et al. 
(2012), and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013). 
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win.  In practice, nearly all lotteries have a negative expected return, while PLS offers a positive nominal 
expected return.   
Given the widespread demand for lottery gambling, it has been hypothesized that the lottery-like 
incentive structure of PLS could be attractive to large numbers of participants (Kearney et al. 2010).  
Indeed, participation rates in the UK’s Premium Bond program, a PLS product, are estimated to be 
between 22 and 40 percent of UK citizens (Tufano 2008).  The PLS account examined in this paper—the 
“Million-a-Month Account,” or MaMa, offered by First National Bank (FNB), a large South African 
retail bank—saw similarly robust demand: within 18 months of the start date of the program there were 
more PLS accounts than regular savings accounts at the bank, and within 3 years PLS deposits amounted 
to R1.4 billion at the bank, as compared to total savings of R4.5 billion in the comparable standard 
savings account (Figure 1). 
[FIGURE 1] 
In addition to attracting deposits, the lottery-like structure of PLS may also appeal to a different 
type of saver.  For example, individuals who feel they have little hope of escaping poverty in the future 
have little incentive to save today (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 2011).   Because 
of this, even if standard savings products are readily available, the poor may be unwilling to use them.  
The large prizes offered by PLS products present the possibility of escaping this “poverty trap” and thus 
may attract individuals who eschew traditional savings products, even if the probability of winning those 
prizes is quite low.  Using survey data from individuals that live near First National Bank branches, we 
find that usage of PLS was especially strong in low- and medium-income areas, and in areas where a high 
percentage of individuals felt unable to repay their debts.  Corroborating this, we also use account-level 
data on employees of FNB and find that individuals who were the largest net borrowers from the bank 
were most likely to open a PLS account, while those with moderate savings amounts were least likely.  
This is in line with recent experimental evidence that shows individuals with low initial savings are 
especially attracted to PLS products (Atalay et al. 2012; Filiz-Ozbay et al. 2013; Tufano, Maynard, and 
De Neve 2008).  Further, we also find that employees who had no standard deposit accounts previously 
3 
were 4.9% more likely to open a PLS account than those with accounts.  This suggests that PLS may be 
uniquely positioned to attract savings from individuals who are less likely to maintain emergency savings. 
An important issue in evaluating PLS is whether these types of accounts attract new savings or 
merely cannibalize regular savings.  Both Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) show that the 
introduction of a PLS-like option increases savings rates in experimental settings.  Using account-level 
data, we show that bank employees who open a PLS account tend to increase their net savings at First 
National Bank by about 1% of their income, a 38% increase from the mean level of savings.  We do not 
find any evidence that employees who open PLS accounts decrease their savings in standard FNB savings 
products.  Rather, we show that they tend to increase deposits in regular savings accounts as well.  
Further, we show that demand for the PLS program nationwide was especially strong in periods when the 
jackpot of the South Africa National Lottery was small, suggesting that PLS and lottery gambling may act 
as substitutes.
2
  Taken together, these findings show no evidence that PLS cannibalizes regular savings. 
A unique feature of PLS is the fact that “lucky” account holders win prizes.  In the PLS program 
run by First National Bank, each month a total of 113 prizes were awarded, including a grand prize of 
R1,000,000 (approximately $150,000) and R500,000 in smaller prizes.  We track the accounts of these 
randomly selected prize-winners and test whether they are more likely to close their accounts after 
winning, or whether winning a prize induces them to invest more in PLS.  Relative to non-winners, 
winners of small R1,000 prizes are 4.2% more likely to close their accounts within one year of winning 
their prize, while winners of larger prizes are no more likely to close their accounts.  Despite being more 
likely to close their accounts, however, prize winners on average keep substantially more in their accounts 
than those who did not win prizes.  In some cases, prize winners increase their account balances in PLS 
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 This is also consistent with evidence in Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013), which both show that 
PLS demand is especially strong among lottery players. 
4 
by more than the amount won, indicating that this increased investment in PLS is more than just a wealth 
effect.
3
  This increased savings is persistent for at least one year after winning. 
We also find that large prize winners create a “buzz” that generates more demand for PLS in the 
local area.  In particular, bank branches which had a R1,000,000 prize winner experienced 11.6% excess 
growth in PLS deposits (over and above the amount awarded as a prize) in the month after the win, 
relative to all other bank branches.  Thus, the excitement of winning a prize has spillover effects that also 
serve to increase savings by other individuals. 
This paper connects to a broad literature that investigates why many individuals fail to save and 
what financial innovations might help them save more, such as default options (Carroll et al. 2009), 
commitment devices (Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006), or simply reminding 
individuals to save (Karlan et al. 2012).  Our paper adds to this research by providing a first micro-level 
look at the usage and consequences of prize-linked savings.  In particular, our findings provide insight 
into a number of questions raised by previous research on PLS.  In their overview of PLS, Kearney et al. 
(2010) state that “the key question yet to be answered is whether the availability of prize-linked savings 
would generate new savers and new saving, and if so by whom.”  Our evidence suggests that PLS can 
indeed attract new savers and new saving, and that, relative to typical savings accounts, PLS is 
particularly attractive to cash constrained and poorer individuals.  Our evidence is consistent with the 
theory that standard savings products are under-used by poor individuals because they feel they have no 
hope of accumulating significant savings in these products (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010; Banerjee 
and Duflo 2011) and is in line with previous research that has shown that lottery demand is particularly 
strong for disadvantaged members of society (for an overview of this research, see Herring & Bledsoe 
1994).  Our findings also build on Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) who use experiments 
to show that PLS tends to increase total savings, particularly among individuals with low savings or who 
are lottery players.  Our findings are directly in line with this evidence.  Finally, our results are relevant to 
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 For example, increased investment after winning a prize could be due to a “house money” effect, in which 
gamblers are more willing to accept risks after a prior gain (Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
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Lusardi et al. (2011), who find that gamblers are particularly prone to lack precautionary savings.  By 
combining a gambling element with savings, PLS provides a natural way for these individuals become 
less financially fragile.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II gives background information on 
First National Bank’s PLS product and the data used in our analysis.  Section III provides results on the 
characteristics of PLS participants, while Section IV presents evidence on whether PLS reduces deposits 
in regular savings products or in the amount of lottery gambling.  Section V then discusses how winning a 
prize affects both the prize winner and others nearby.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Background and Data 
A.  First National Bank’s Prize-Linked Savings Product 
The data for this paper come from First National Bank, the retail and commercial bank subsidiary 
of FirstRand Bank Limited, the third largest bank in South Africa.
4
  First National Bank introduced a PLS 
account in January, 2005 in an effort to expand its deposit base among low-income and unbanked 
individuals (see Cole et al. 2008, who also discuss the informal savings programs that exist in South 
Africa).   
First National called its PLS account the "Million-a-Month Account," or MaMa, and awarded a 
grand prize of R1,000,000 to one random account-holder each month, with the winning account number 
announced on national television.  In addition to the grand prize, the bank initially also awarded two 
prizes of R100,000, 10 prizes of R20,000, and 100 prizes of R1,000 each month.  In September, 2007, the 
bank doubled the number of smaller prizes given each month, awarding four R100,000 prizes, 20 
R20,000 prizes, and 200 R1,000 prizes.
5
  Throughout the program, each account-holder received one 
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 There were a total of 17 banks functioning in South Africa in 2008, of which the four largest account for 91% of 
total assets (South African Reserve Bank 2008). 
5
 Pfiffelmann (2013) shows that a highly-skewed prize structure is the optimal design for PLS when investors 
overweight rare events. 
6 
entry into the lottery for each R100 held in her account.
6
  MaMa accounts were 32-day notice accounts, 
meaning that if a customer wished to withdraw some of her funds she must notify the bank 32 days in 
advance of the withdrawal.
7
  The most comparable account at First National to MaMa was a standard 32-
day notice account, which paid interest on a variable scale depending on the customer's balance in the 
account.  As of November, 2004, for balances below R10,000 the 32-day account paid 4% annual interest, 
for balances between R10,000 and R25,000 it paid 4.25% APR, and for balances from R25,000 to 
R250,000 the APR ranged from 4.5% to 4.75% (Cole et al. 2008). 
In contrast to the regular 32-day account, the expected return to holding MaMa balances 
depended on the amount of deposits held in the accounts.  As the total amount of deposits increased, the 
expected return on a 100 Rand deposit decreased, because the chance of winning a prize declined.  The 
new MaMa accounts proved to be quite popular, and deposits increased dramatically in the first months 
(Figure 1).  Although the total amount held in MaMa accounts never approached the aggregate balance of 
the regular 32-day accounts, the number of MaMa accounts exceeded that of regular 32-day accounts by 
June 2006, a mere 18 months after the product was launched.  Because of this growth, the expected 
interest rate on MaMa accounts declined rapidly.  When the first drawing was held in March 2005 (three 
months after the start date of the program), the expected annualized interest rate for holding R100 in a 
MaMa account was about 12.2%, due to the relatively small amount of total deposits.  However, as the 
popularity of the program grew, the expected return quickly dropped, and by December 2005 the rate was 
3.64%, slightly lower than that offered by the regular 32-day account.
8
  At its lowest, the expected interest 
rate on MaMa accounts was 1.59% in August 2007, just before the number of prizes was doubled. 
An individual with a preference for lottery-like returns could duplicate the PLS structure by 
depositing funds in a regular 32-day account and then using the interest earned from this account to 
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 Initially, the accounts paid no interest at all, but the bank began paying a 0.25% interest rate on deposits in addition 
to the random prizes in September 2005. 
7
 32-day notice accounts are common in South Africa and are offered by all of the major banks there. 
8
 Barberis and Huang (2008) show that an asset with lottery-like payoffs can earn negative excess returns when 
investors overweight small probabilities, as in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
7 
purchase lottery tickets.  This strategy duplicates the MaMa account by combining two other readily 
available alternatives, and is thus a useful comparison to the MaMa expected return.  From 2005-2008, 
the expected return on the South African National Lottery was about 46 cents per Rand invested.
9
  An 
individual seeking a skewed return could have deposited, say, R100 (the amount needed for one entry in 
the MaMa program) in a regular 32-day account and earned R4 of interest in a given year.  If he then used 
the R4 to purchase lottery tickets, his expected winnings would amount to about R1.86, giving a net 
return of 1.86% on his investment of R100.  As noted above, expected returns in the MaMa program were 
significantly higher than this amount early on, but dropped to an amount quite close to this as the 
popularity of the program grew.  In MaMa’s final year, expected returns averaged 1.81% and were quite 
stable, suggesting that equilibrium PLS returns settled near what could have been earned via this synthetic 
PLS-like investment. 
The MaMa program only lasted until March 2008, when it was deemed a violation of the Lottery 
Act of 1997 by the Supreme Court of Appeals (FirstRand Bank v. National Lotteries Board 2008).  In 
South Africa, as in the U.S., the government holds a monopoly on lotteries.  Although First National 
argued that its program wasn't technically a lottery, since all principal was preserved, it failed to convince 
the courts and was forced to end the program.  At the end of March, all MaMa accounts were converted to 
regular 32-day accounts, and account holders were allowed to withdraw their deposits if they chose to do 
so.  The data provided by First National ends in July 2008, four months after the program ended.  During 
that time period, aggregate MaMa balances fell 16.2% in April 2008, and an additional 11.8% in May.  
However, balances held steady in June and July, at which point our data end.  Thus, while some 
participants in the program did withdraw their funds, over 77% of all PLS deposits remained in the bank 
for at least four months after the accounts converted to standard savings products. 
B. Data 
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 This negative 54% return is similar to that found for other lotteries (e.g. Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). 
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Most of the data for this paper come directly from First National Bank, which provided three 
main datasets: branch-level data for all bank branches, anonymized account-level data for all bank 
employees, and anonymized account-level data for all prize winners.  The bank also provided us with 
bank-wide data on total accounts and total deposits held in MaMa accounts at a daily frequency.  We 
augment the data from First National Bank with the 2005 FinScope financial survey of South Africa, 
provided by FinMark Trust.  Details of each dataset are described below. 
B.1.  First National Bank Data 
First National provided both branch-level and account-level data for this paper.  At the branch 
level, we have monthly observations for each of 604 bank branches from January 2003 through July 2008.  
For each month, we observe the total number of accounts and total Rand balance held at the branch in 
both standard 32-day accounts and MaMa accounts.  Table I provides summary statistics of the total 
number of accounts and total deposits at each branch as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended. 
[TABLE I] 
In addition to branch-level time series data, we also observe branch-level demographic 
characteristics of depositors in both 32-day and MaMa products for one snapshot taken in June 2008, 3 
months after the MaMa program ended.  This allows us to compare the characteristics of MaMa 
participants to those of typical savers, which we do in Table I.  With respect to race, MaMa depositors are 
less likely to be white, and more likely to be Asian or of mixed race.
10
  Men account for a total of 52% of 
MaMa deposits, as compared to only 46% of regular 32-day deposits, suggesting that the lottery payoff 
structure might be more attractive to men than women, perhaps due to lower risk aversion (Eckel and 
Grossman 2008) or overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2001).  MaMa participants also tended to be 
younger than standard 32-day account holders (Figure 2, Panel A).  This is important, as younger 
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 Black persons are those of native African descent.  Asian persons include those of Indian descent. 
9 
individuals also tend to be those who maintain less precautionary savings (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 
2011).
11
  
[FIGURE 2] 
The income profile of MaMa savers appears to be similar to that of regular savers (Figure 2, 
Panel B).  In fact, those in the lowest income bracket account for a slightly larger share of total 32-day 
balances (45%) than of MaMa balances (42%).  While some of the evidence in Section III suggests that 
the MaMa product had more demand in lower-income areas, it should be kept in mind that overall it does 
not appear that MaMa savings came disproportionately from low-income households. 
In addition to the relatively coarse branch-level data, we also analyze account-level data for 
employees of First National Bank.  This dataset contains month-by-month information on account 
balances of 38,256 employees of First National Bank for the time period from January 2005 - March 
2008.  For each employee, we observe the month-end balance of their 32-day savings, checking, money 
market
12
, and MaMa accounts.  In addition, we also have a snapshot of the employee's race, gender, age, 
income estimate
13
, and the region of South Africa in which they work.  Summary statistics of employee 
account balances are provided in Table I, Panel C. 
Of the 38,256 employees, 12,237 had their employment terminated at some point during the 
sample period.  In all regressions, we include an ex-staff dummy to control for these individuals, but our 
results are unchanged if these individuals are removed completely. 
     There are both advantages and disadvantages to working with staff data.  Using account-level 
data we get much finer estimates of the effects of PLS.  However, as the staff of the bank is not a 
representative sample of the South African population, this subsample may limit external validity.  For 
example, only 41% of bank employees are black as compared to 73% in the population at large.  Of more 
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 The money market account was a special account available only to staff of the bank that was launched in July 
2007, towards the end of the sample period. 
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 Income data was not directly available from First National and was instead estimated by the bank according to an 
internal model. 
10 
particular concern is the fact that bank employees are likely better educated and earn more than the 
population in general.  The average First National employee earns R175,963 per year, while in 2006 
average household income in South Africa was estimated to be R74,589 (Statistics South Africa 2008).  
Finally, just over 22% of the staff in our sample have no checking, money market, 32-day, or PLS 
account at FNB.  Nationwide, about 47% of individuals were completely unbanked in South Africa in 
2005.  To the extent possible, we control for staff characteristics in our analysis, but we do note that there 
are large differences between the staff sample and the general population.  
Another potential limitation of the staff dataset is that we can only observe deposit accounts held 
at FNB, and thus we do not observe their total portfolio if they hold savings elsewhere.  However, based 
on FinScope Survey data (described below), we estimate that only 3.3% of South Africans have accounts 
at multiple banks, conditional on having at least one account.  Meanwhile, of survey respondents that 
reported having no bank accounts, only 6.3% maintain any savings at home.  In addition, one would 
expect that the majority of First National employees would do most or all of their banking at First 
National due to familiarity with the products, the ease of banking where you work, extra benefits of 
banking at work (in particular the ability to utilize overdraft facilities, as discussed below), and likely 
encouragement to use the products.  Thus, although we cannot observe the entire portfolio of all 
employees, we likely have a relatively comprehensive view of staff banking behavior. 
An important aspect of the staff data is that it contains information on checking account balances, 
which are often negative.  Bank staff can easily obtain an overdraft facility on their checking accounts; 
this facility offers flexible repayment possibilities. These negative balances can be interpreted as 
unsecured consumer credit obtained from the bank.  Table I shows that a significant number of bank staff 
have negative balances in their checking accounts.  Net of these negative balances, the average employee 
had about R4,930 in savings across all accounts at the bank in March 2008, or about 3.5% of their annual 
income.  A total of 29% of employees are net borrowers from the bank, while just over 22% have no 
active accounts at the bank at all.  To prevent undue influence of a few outlier employees with either large 
11 
savings or large borrowings, in all of our analysis using the staff dataset we winsorize account balances at 
the 1% and 99%. 
Finally, we also have account-level information on prize winners.  In the winners dataset we have 
month-by-month information on MaMa account balances and demographic information only; account 
balances in other products were not provided.  In total there were 4,965 prizes given out to 4,341 account 
holders (some account holders won more than once) between March 2005, when the first drawing was 
held, and March 2008, when the program closed. 
B.2.  FinScope Data 
We augment the data obtained from First National Bank with geographic, demographic, and 
socioeconomic data collected in the 2005 FinScope Survey.  FinScope surveys are nationally 
representative surveys carried out annually by FinMark Trust, and are designed to measure the use of 
financial products by consumers in South Africa.  The 2005 survey contains responses from 3,885 
individuals, and has in-depth information on each respondent’s financial sophistication, use of financial 
products, attitudes towards financial service providers, income and employment status, demographic 
information, and indicators of their general well-being. 
We relate these characteristics to MaMa demand at individual First National Bank branches by 
calculating the average response of individuals who live near each branch.  Specifically, we use the 
latitude and longitude of each bank branch and the latitude and longitude of the center of the city or town 
of each FinScope respondent to measure the distance between the two locations using the Haversine 
formula.  For each branch, we average the values for all respondents within a 50km (31.1 miles) radius of 
the branch, thereby giving the general characteristics of individuals who are likely to use that particular 
bank branch. 
Table II provides summary statistics of the collapsed survey data at the branch level.  For 62 of 
the bank branches there were no survey responses with 50 km, dropping the number of observations to a 
12 
total of 542 branches.
14
  In addition, there are 11 private branches which we remove from the sample, 
leaving a total of 531 observations.  Of particular note is the high share of individuals with no bank 
accounts at all (49%) as well as very elevated unemployment rates (25%).   
In the analysis in Section III, we correlate FinScope’s Financial Segmentation Model (FSM) with 
demand for MaMa.  The FSM places individuals in one of eight tiers based on answers to a set of 
questions in the survey.  The model is made up of five components, each of which is meant to capture a 
specific aspect of each individual’s access and use of financial services, along with how people manage 
their money and what drives their financial behavior: 
 Financial penetration: take-up of available financial products 
 Financial access: physical access to financial services 
 Financial discipline 
 Financial knowledge 
 Connectedness and optimism: individual’s overall feeling of fulfillment, of being 
connected to their community, and of having hope of achieving their lifetime goals
15
 
The respondent’s combined score across these five categories is used to segment the population into eight 
tiers, with higher tiers signifying individuals who have more access to take-up of and access to financial 
products, have more financial discipline and knowledge, and feel more connected and optimistic. 
[TABLE II] 
III. MaMa Product Adoption 
The widespread growth of MaMa was remarkable.  By June 2008, the number of MaMa accounts 
at First National Bank exceeded the number of 32-day savings accounts at First National for every age, 
gender, income, and race subgroup.
16
  Among employees of the bank, just 27% used a regular 32-day 
savings account (we define this as having had a positive balance for at least one month) during January 
2005 - March 2008, while 63% opened a MaMa account during the sample period.  Why was MaMa so 
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http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2005/SA05_brochure.pdf. 
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 However, average account balances were much lower in MaMa accounts than regular 32-day savings. 
13 
popular?  In this section we analyze the characteristics that are associated with opening a PLS account 
using both FinScope survey data as well as account-level data of First National employees.  Knowledge 
of what drives demand for PLS can help academics and policymakers alike understand how consumers 
think about savings and gambling, as well as assess the potential for PLS to encourage precautionary 
savings. 
A. Geographic characteristics and MaMa demand 
Because of its lottery-like payoff, it has been hypothesized that PLS might be attractive to low-
wealth individuals, those with less education, or perhaps to particular racial groups, as these gropus have 
been shown to a larger percentage of their income on lottery gambling in other settings (Kearney et al. 
2010).  We test these intuitions by correlating take-up of the MaMa product at each bank branch to 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals who live within 50 km of the branch, using 
responses to the 2005 FinScope survey.  Panel A of Table III presents OLS regressions which relate 
overall MaMa usage at a particular branch with demographic characteristics of individuals who live near 
the branch.  In these regressions, the dependent variable is either the log of the total balances held in 
MaMa accounts at the branch or the log of the total number of MaMa accounts as of March 2008.  To 
determine whether demand for MaMa products differs from the demand for regular 32-day savings, we 
control for the log of the total balance held in 32-day savings accounts in the first columnor the log of the 
total number of accounts in the second column.
17
  We also control for whether the branch is located in a 
rural area to account for branch size differences. 
[TABLE III] 
Confirming the intuition that the possibility of winning large prizes is attractive for low-income 
households, we find a negative relationship between median income and MaMa demand.  We estimate 
that a one standard deviation decrease in median income (a reduction of R 18,462 per year) would 
increase total balances held in MaMa accounts by 15.25 percentage points at a given branch.  While this 
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 Similar results are found if the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of MaMa balances to savings balances 
instead of including the total savings balance as a right-hand side variable. 
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finding is in line with intuition of demand for lottery products by low-wealth individuals, it is not entirely 
consistent with the results presented in Panel B of Figure 2, which shows that MaMa balances did not 
come disproportionately from lower-income households.  We return to this issue with more evidence 
below in Section III.B.   
Other demographic controls do not have a strong relationship with MaMa demand.  Of particular 
note, we do not find that branches in more educated areas experienced lower PLS demand.  If anything, 
these branches had slightly higher MaMa usage, although this result is only significant at the 10% level.  
Based on this, it does not appear to PLS demand is coming predominantly from less-educated individuals 
who perhaps do not understand standard interest-bearing accounts. Panel B of Table III tests whether 
additional financial characteristics are associated with MaMa demand.  To be concise, we only report 
results for total amount of MaMa deposits as the dependent variable, but results are similar if we instead 
use the number of MaMa accounts.  We fail to find evidence that take-up of MaMa was higher in areas 
with more unbanked individuals.  In the next two columns, we use FinScope’s Financial Segmentation 
Model as an independent variable and test its association with PLS demand.  The FSM categorizes 
individuals according to their financial access, knowledge, discipline, and usage of financial products, as 
well as their overall optimism and connectedness.  When we include the average overall FSM tier for the 
area we again fail to find a strong relationship between FSM and MaMa demand.  However, when we 
split the FSM by its components, we find that the only strong correlate of MaMa usage is low levels of 
optimism and connectedness. 
The optimism and connectedness FSM score is derived from a set of survey questions that are 
designed to measure an individual’s satisfaction with their life, how hopeful they are of reaching their life 
dreams, and how connected they feel to others around them.
18
  In some ways, it is unsurprising that this is 
the only FSM component that shows a significant relationship to MaMa usage, as all of the other 
components are likely highly correlated with the demographic controls already included in the 
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 For example, respondents are asked whether they agree with statements such as, “I have many dreams in life but 
will never achieve them,” “My life has meaning and purpose,” “I feel lonely,” and “In many ways, my life is ideal.”  
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regressions.  However, it is striking that it is in areas in which individuals feel least hopeful that we see 
the highest usage of the MaMa product.  As mentioned above, optimism—in particular, over-weighting of 
small probabilities—has been found to be a significant driver of demand for lotteries and PLS; it is, 
however, not necessarily the case that individuals who are attracted to lotteries are overly optimistic in all 
areas of their lives.  Rather, depressed or pessimistic individuals are likely to value the “dream” of 
winning the jackpot the most (Thaler and Ziemba 1988; Brunnermeier and Parker 2005), and these results 
suggest that this desire is perhaps a significant driver of PLS demand (Tufano 2008).  This finding is also 
related to evidence from the Consumer Federation of America and The Financial Planning Association 
(2006), which found that 21% of Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below $25,000, thought that 
winning the lottery represents the most practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thousand 
dollars.  Individuals who feel that their dreams are extremely difficult to reach may very well feel as if the 
only way possible for them even to have a chance at reaching those goals is by winning a large prize.  
PLS differs from standard savings accounts by offering highly skewed payouts, making large wealth 
accumulation possible. 
In the final two columns of Panel B, we more directly test whether individuals who are struggling 
financially are more likely to use PLS.  The key independent variable in these regressions is the 
percentage of individuals living near a bank branch who agreed with the statement, “You never seem to 
be able to pay off your debt, your debt just keeps getting worse.”  Individuals who feel this way may be 
more likely to use PLS because it represents a chance for them to pay off their debts and escape a 
“poverty trap,” while standard savings products do not accumulate enough interest to do so (Banerjee and 
Mullainathan 2010).  In addition, financial constraints themselves could lead individuals to play the 
lottery (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012; Haisley, Mostafa, and Loewenstein 2008). 
We find that branches in more indebted areas experienced higher MaMa demand, but the 
relationship is statistically insignificant (second to last column).  However, there are a few outlier 
branches which had an extremely high percentage of respondents who were unable to repay their debts.  
In the final column of Panel B we remove branches above the 98
th
 percentile, corresponding to areas 
16 
where greater than 40% of individuals are unable to pay off their debts.
19
  When these branches are 
removed, the relationship becomes much stronger and is significant at the 1% level.  In terms of economic 
magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the share of individuals who feel unable to pay their debts 
(increase of 8.7%) is associated with a 14.3 percentage point increase in MaMa demand.  This is added 
evidence that PLS is particularly attractive to individuals who are looking for a way to significantly 
change their economic circumstances.    
B. MaMa demand among bank employees 
While the FinScope survey data provides a representative sample of households near bank 
branches, the resulting averages are necessarily coarse measures of general geographic characteristics.  In 
this section we use account-level data on First National Bank employees to associate MaMa demand with 
individual characteristics.  Table IV presents results from linear probability models in which we estimate 
the relationship between income, age, gender, race, and past saving behavior with the propensity to open a 
MaMa account for 38,262 employees of the bank.
20
  In all models we include 34 regional fixed effects to 
account for geographic differences in MaMa take-up, where regions are as defined by First National 
Bank. 
[TABLE IV] 
    Panel A of Table IV compares demand for standard savings products and demand for MaMa 
across different demographic characteristics.  The dependent variable in the first column is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the employee had a positive balance in a standard 32-day savings account at FNB 
at any time between January 2005 and March 2008, when the MaMa product was available.  The second 
column is similar except it equals one if there was a positive balance in either a standard 32-day savings 
account or a special employee-only money market account that the bank made available in July 2007.  
The estimates in these first two columns can then be directly compared to the coefficient reported in the 
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 Many of these outlier branches had only a few survey participants within 50 km, resulting in noisy measures of 
indebtedness. 
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 Tables IV, V, and VII present linear probability models estimated by OLS, but essentially identical results are 
found if the models are estimated using probit or logit models. 
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third column, in which the dependent variable equals one if the employee at any time had a positive 
balance in a MaMa account. 
Given previous literature suggesting that PLS could be particularly attractive for low-income 
individuals, results on the relationship between income and the propensity to save in a MaMa account are 
of interest.  In the regression results in Table IV, we estimate the relationship between income and MaMa 
usage non-parametrically using income deciles.  By comparing coefficient estimates across deciles, it is 
apparent that demand for both regular savings and PLS is hump-shaped in income, such that the lowest 
and highest deciles are least likely to have an account.
21
  This pattern can be more easily seen in Figure 3, 
where we divide all employees of the bank by income decile, and plot the share of employees that had a 
standard savings product and the share that had a MaMa account at any point during the sample period for 
each decile.  Although the results in Figure 3 are unconditional probabilities of having an account, they 
paint the same picture as the coefficient estimates in Table IV.  While the propensity to have an account is 
hump-shaped in income for both regular savings and PLS account, MaMa usage appears to be somewhat 
less sensitive to income than regular savings.  Further, while the lowest-income employees were the least 
likely to use MaMa, a substantially higher portion had MaMa accounts (46%) than had standard savings 
products (31%).  The share with MaMa accounts exceeds the share with regular savings across all income 
deciles. 
[FIGURE 3] 
When evaluating the relationship between income and demand for MaMa, it is important to keep 
in mind that the majority of bank employees earn substantially more than the median income in South 
Africa.  Because of this, the 1
st
 income decile of our sample includes salaries up to R60,000 per year, 
while the average household income in South Africa in 2006 was about R74,600 per year.  However, even 
limiting to employees with the lowest salaries, the same patterns persist: 33% of those who make less than 
R38,000 per year opened a MaMa account, while only 19% had a 32-day or money market account.  
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 This pattern is likely due to the lowest income groups being less likely to save at all and the highest income 
groups being less likely to save in standard bank products because they have access to alternatives. 
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Taken together with the findings in Section III.A above, it does appear that low income individuals are 
more likely to use a PLS account than a standard savings account, but demand for PLS follows a similar 
pattern across income groups. 
With regards to gender, we find that males are 8.8% less likely than women to have a standard 
savings account, but this gap narrows to only 4.2% for MaMa accounts.  Thus, relative to standard 
savings, MaMa appears more attractive to men in particular, which is in line with Donkers, Melenberg, & 
Soest (2001), who find that men are more likely to play the lottery, and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013), who find 
that men are more likely to save when a PLS option is available in a laboratory experiment.  We also find 
substantial differences in MaMa demand across racial groups.  While black employees are substantially 
more likely to have a savings account than other ethnicities, they are equally likely to have a MaMa 
account as whites and Asians.  Meanwhile, individuals of mixed race are about 4.4% more likely to open 
a MaMa account than other racial groups.
22
 
Panel B of Table IV tests whether previous banking behavior is related to the propensity to open a 
MaMa account after controlling for demographic and geographic characteristics of employees.  The 
regressions in this panel are identical to those in the final column of Panel A, except here we test whether 
the prior banking behavior of the employees is related to the propensity to open a PLS account.  We find 
that employees who did not have any saving or checking accounts at FNB were 4.6% more likely to open 
a MaMa account than those who already had active bank accounts at FNB.  It is important to note that we 
cannot observe whether these employees had active accounts at other banks, so these individuals were not 
necessarily unbanked.  However, given that they worked at FNB it seems reasonable to assume that they 
would be likely to bank at FNB if they have bank accounts anywhere.  If that is the case, this suggests that 
PLS-type products may attract new savers who were previously sitting outside the formal banking sector.   
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 It is difficult to connect our results on race to previous literature due to cultural differences within race across 
countries.  For example, Stinchfield & Winters (1998) find that Hispanic and African American youths have a 
higher propensity of gamble, but it is by no means clear that Africans would have a similar propensity to gamble. 
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The final two columns of Panel B delve further into this issue.  In the middle column, we control 
separately for whether the employee actively used a savings or checking account prior to opening a 
MaMa account, finding that in particular the use of a standard savings account significantly decreases the 
probability of opening a MaMa account, while employees who only had checking accounts were equally 
likely as employees without any accounts at FNB to open a MaMa account.  In the right-most column we 
separate employees by their net balances at the bank, defined as the sum of their checking, 32-day, and 
money market accounts at the bank.  Because employees were allowed to maintain negative balances in 
their checking accounts, a significant portion (28%) are net borrowers from the bank, while 42% of 
employees have net positive balances, and the remaining 30% had no accounts at the bank.  We split the 
group who are net savers into “high savers” and “low savers” depending on whether they had above- or 
below-median net savings at the bank as percentage of annual income.  Similarly, we split the net 
borrowers into two groups, and thus end up with five groups of employees: above-median savers, below-
median savers, those with no accounts, below-median borrowers, and above-median borrowers.  Echoing 
our findings in Section III.A, of these five groups, employees who have borrowed the most from the bank 
are the most likely to open a MaMa account.  Next most likely are those with no accounts and those with 
above-median savings.  Staff with small amounts of borrowing or small amounts of saving are the least 
likely to use MaMa.  The differences between the groups are substantial; those with high net borrowing 
are nearly 18% more likely to open a MaMa account than those with a small amount of savings.  If this 
group is interpreted to be the most financially constrained, the result is consistent with PLS attracting 
non-traditional savers.  
Taken together, our findings are indicative that demand for PLS comes from a broad range of 
consumers across all income levels, age brackets, and ethnicities, consistent with previous research 
showing broad-based preferences for skewness (Scott and Horvath 1980; Mitton and Vorkink 2007; 
Barberis and Huang 2008).  In addition, the financial position and experience of an individual are 
important predictors of PLS demand.  In particular, demand for the MaMa product was strongest among 
financially constrained individuals, as evidenced both by the FinScope survey results as well as high 
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demand by bank staff who had borrowed heavily from the bank.  Finally, bank employees without any 
deposit accounts at First National exhibited strong demand for MaMa, suggesting that PLS can bring new 
savers into a bank.   
IV. Banking behavior of PLS participants 
A. Did MaMa attract new savings? 
While the evidence in Section III shows that MaMa attracted new savers into the banking system, 
it is also important to test whether PLS can generate significant new net savings, rather than just 
cannibalizing existing savings.  We note two important data limitations of this portion of our analysis.  
First, our individual-level data on FNB employees only contains information on their accounts held at 
FNB, and thus we cannot observe if these individuals have savings at home, in other banks, or in savings 
clubs or other informal institutions.  Thus, we can test whether individuals who open MaMa accounts 
reduce savings held in other FNB accounts, but we cannot observe whether they are reducing savings held 
elsewhere.  However, data from the FinScope survey shows that only 2.96% of South Africans had 
deposit accounts at multiple banks in 2005.  In addition, only 1.73% of unbanked South Africans report 
that they regularly save any of their income either at home or in savings clubs.  These figures suggest that 
it is unlikely that many of the individuals in our sample hold significant savings elsewhere.   
A second important caveat is that the MaMa program was not a randomized experiment, and 
therefore we cannot draw unambiguous causal inference between usage of MaMa and increases in overall 
savings.  However, we find no evidence that MaMa account holders reduced their savings in standard 
savings products at FNB.   
Figure 4 provides a first look at the correlation between MaMa take-up and regular 32-day 
account balances.  In this figure, we plot the average monthly growth rate of regular 32-day balances for 
two sets of bank branches: those that had above-median growth in MaMa account balances and those with 
below-median MaMa growth.  Prior to the introduction of MaMa, average savings growth rates were very 
similar between the two sets of branches.  After the MaMa program became active, those branches that 
had high average MaMa account growth also saw significantly higher growth in regular 32-day balances.  
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If significant cannibalization of standard savings were occurring, one would expect just the opposite 
pattern. 
[FIGURE 4] 
Account-level evidence from bank employees presents the same result.  Figure 5 plots the change 
in net savings over time for employees that opened MaMa accounts relative to employees that did not 
open accounts.  We define net savings as the sum of all deposit accounts, including 32-day, money 
market, checking, and MaMa, and then scale this amount by the annual income of the employee.  We then 
estimate the following regression:  
              ∑     
   
  
     
       
where   indicates employees and   indicates months.       is the worker’s level of total net savings at the 
bank as a percent of income at time  ,    is a vector of worker characteristics including age, race, income, 
and gender, and      denotes region-by-time fixed effects.      
  are dummy variables equal to one if month 
  is   months after (or before, if    ) the employee opened a MaMa account, and zero otherwise.  The 
main coefficients of interest are   , which show whether employees who opened MaMa accounts tended 
to have more or less savings   months after opening MaMa.  Employees that never open an account will 
have     
    for all observations, and serve as the control group.     
[FIGURE 5] 
In Figure 5, Panel A we plot our estimates of    as well as 95% confidence intervals based on the 
above regression.
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  As shown in Section III, prior to opening MaMa, these individuals tend to have lower 
than average savings levels relative to employees that never opened a MaMa account.  About 2 months 
prior to opening a PLS account, total net savings begins to increase, with a large jump in savings 
occurring on the month that the MaMa account is opened.  From this point onwards, MaMa participants 
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 Confidence intervals are calculated using standard errors that are clustered at the individual level.  The regressions 
have a total of 1.56 million observations.  
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maintain roughly 1% of annual income more in total net savings at the bank, relative to non-participants.  
This represents a 38% increase from the average savings level of 2.9% of annual income.  
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the trend in regular 32-day balances around the opening of a MaMa 
account.  This chart is created in exactly the same way as Panel A, except that here the dependent variable 
in the regression is deposits in regular 32-day accounts as a percentage of annual income, rather than total 
net savings at the bank.  If PLS is cannibalizing regular savings, one would expect to see regular savings 
balances decreasing when PLS accounts are opened.  Instead, we find that employees who opened MaMa 
accounts tended also to increase their balances in regular 32-day accounts by about 0.3% of income.  Put 
differently, about 30% of the increase in total savings held by MaMa participants was in standard 32-day 
accounts, not the PLS product.
24
 
It is important to note that the choice to open a MaMa account is endogenous, and so we cannot 
ascribe a causal relationship between opening a MaMa account and higher overall savings or higher 32-
day balances.  Indeed, the fact that savings balances tend to increase in the two months prior to opening a 
MaMa account suggests that some of those who chose to open a MaMa account likely did so because of a 
desire to save more (e.g., a positive wealth or income shock) and thus increased their balances in standard 
savings accounts as well.  Because of this, we cannot rule out the possibility that MaMa participants 
would have had even higher 32-day savings balances than those who did not open MaMa accounts had 
MaMa not been available.  However, both Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) use lab 
experiments to show that PLS accounts tend to increase overall savings rates, and our results are in line 
with this evidence. 
B. MaMa demand and lottery gambling 
Kearney et al. (2010) hypothesize that “the introduction of prize-linked savings products could 
provide an alternative to lottery tickets that offers a higher (and certainly less negative) return on one’s 
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 Importantly, we find similar results if we limit the sample to employees who had regular 32-day savings accounts 
prior to opening a MaMa account.  Thus, the effect is driven partly by new account openings but also by individuals 
increasing deposits in pre-existing standard accounts. 
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‘investment.’”  Given the similar payoff structure, and previously documented substitutions between 
gambling and saving (Consumer Federation of America and The Financial Planning Association 2006; 
Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011), PLS could act as a natural substitute for lottery gambling.  Further, 
experimental evidence in Atalay et al. (2012) shows that the introduction of a PLS program can reduce 
lottery expenditure. 
We use random variation in the size of the jackpot of the National Lottery to test whether PLS 
demand and lottery demand are linked.  Lottery prize winners in South Africa are drawn each Wednesday 
and Saturday, and the size of the jackpot is a function of the number of lottery tickets sold in each period.  
However, when a grand prize winner is not drawn, the jackpot rolls over to the next period, creating 
random periods in which jackpots are substantially larger than others.  If MaMa is a substitute for lottery 
gambling, one would expect that MaMa demand should be lower in periods when the lottery jackpot is 
particularly high.  We use daily data on both the amount of new deposits placed in MaMa accounts and 
the number of new MaMa accounts created to calculate the total amount of new balances and number of 
new accounts at the bank during each draw period.  We can then use a time series regression to test 
whether MaMa demand (i.e., the number of new accounts created or amount of new funds deposited) was 
lower during draw periods with larger lottery jackpots. 
Table V presents results from this estimation.  The main independent variables in these 
regressions are dummies for the estimated size of the jackpot for each particular draw.  These estimates 
were published by the National Lottery at the beginning of each draw period to generate demand for the 
lottery, and were hence readily available for potential consumers.
25
  We include both the 
contemporaneous jackpot as well as the jackpot from the previous draw to account for possible lags in the 
                                                                
25
 Actual jackpots are very close to estimates.  Estimated jackpots are derived from estimates of lottery ticket sales, 
combined with any jackpot which was rolled over from previous periods, or any special promotions (such as a 
guaranteed jackpot). 
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relationship between lottery jackpots and MaMa demand.
26
  We include a number of controls to account 
for other factors that may affect MaMa demand, including an indicator of whether the draw took place on 
a Saturday or a Wednesday and also an indicator of draw periods which offered less opportunity for 
customers to open MaMa accounts, because of bank holidays.  Between March and October 2007 the 
National Lottery was shut down due to disputes over the ownership of the license to run the lottery, and 
so there are no jackpot draws for this time period (and these months are not included in the regressions).  
We include broad time dummies which split the sample into four time periods of roughly 9 months in 
length each: January – September 2005, October 2005 – June 2006, July 2006 – March 2007, and October 
2007- March 2008.  Including these time dummies controls for changes in the MaMa program—
specifically, the introduction of a 0.25% interest rate in September 2005 and the doubling of prizes in 
September 2007—and helps take account of long-run trends in the growth of MaMa accounts.  We also 
control for the growth in regular 32-day savings balances and accounts at the bank, to account for factors 
that might be driving savings in general at the bank.  Lastly, we include a lag of the dependent variable to 
help remove serial correlation.  Newey-West standard errors which account for up to 2 weeks of serial 
correlation are reported. 
[TABLE V] 
In support of the hypothesis that PLS can act as a substitute for lottery gambling, we show that 
MaMa demand was lower in draw periods with larger jackpots.  When the anticipated jackpot was 
between R4 million and R7 million (the third quartile) or over R7 million (fourth quartile), there was a 
reduction in total new deposits in MaMa accounts of 12.4% and 15.1%, respectively.  Similarly, when 
jackpots are in the third (fourth) quartile total new MaMa accounts created decreased by about 341 (269), 
a decrease of 9.8% (7.7%) from the mean of 3,483 new accounts created per draw period.
27
   Further, we 
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 For example, it possible that excitement from a large jackpot in the previous draw could continue to diminish 
demand for PLS.  Excluding lagged jackpots does not alter the coefficients on contemporaneous jackpots 
significantly. 
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 It is somewhat odd that the relationship between new MaMa accounts created and jackpot size is non-monotonic, 
as the estimated impact of jackpots in the 3
rd
 quartile is larger than that of the 4
th
 quartile.  However, standard errors 
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also find evidence that one-period (3 days) lagged large jackpots also have a negative impact on MaMa 
demand relative to small jackpots, suggesting that even the recent memory of a large prize may entice 
some would-be PLS savers to purchase lottery tickets.
28
 
These results strongly suggest that MaMa was indeed acting as a substitute for lottery gambling, 
meaning that reduced lottery expenditure is likely one of the main sources for additional savings 
deposited in PLS accounts.  Paradoxically, however, we find no discontinuous increase in MaMa demand 
when the National Lottery was shut down in March 2007, nor do we find a decrease in demand when it 
re-opened in October of 2007.  While these are only two data points and there are other possible factors 
that could be affecting MaMa demand during this period
29
, it is surprising that there was not a 
discontinuous or even noticeable increase in MaMa usage during this period.  Further work, with 
individual-level data on PLS usage and lottery expenditure may help fully resolve this question.  
V. Prize winning and saving 
A. Prize winner’s own behavior 
The very aspect that makes prize-linked savings unique—randomly assigned prizes—also makes 
it an interesting environment to study what individuals do with a cash windfall.  In this section, we use 
account-level data for the 4,965 prize winners to test whether winning a prize increases or decreases 
demand for PLS.   
Because prizes were awarded randomly, conditional on the MaMa account balance prior to the 
win, a prize is an exogenous shock to the financial situation of an account holder. We can examine 
whether that individual continues to invest in PLS and, if so, how much she holds in her account.  Ex 
ante, it is unclear whether winning a prize will increase or decrease an individual’s demand for PLS.  On 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
are large enough that we cannot statistically rule out that the true coefficient for the 4
th
 quartile is indeed larger than 
that of the 3
rd
 quartile, leaving open the possibility that this anomaly is simply due to statistical noise. 
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 We find no evidence of a relationship for lags longer than 1 draw period (3 days). 
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 Several concurrent events could also have affected MaMa demand around the lottery shutdown, including a series 
of appeals in the ongoing lawsuit between FNB and the National Lottery Board regarding the legality of the MaMa 
program in April and June 2007, as well as the doubling of MaMa prizes in September 2007.  
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one hand, if an individual has invested in PLS with the hopes of dramatically improving his 
socioeconomic status, once a large prize has been won he might be expected to close his account and 
invest in more standard investment products, since his goal has been achieved.  This effect should be 
especially prevalent for larger prizes.  On the other hand, it is also possible that lottery play has an 
addictive aspect to it (Guryan and Kearney 2010), and that winning a prize serves to strengthen this tie. 
In Table VI we estimate the probability that a prize-winner still has a MaMa account open six 
months or one year after winning, relative to employees of the bank who did not win prizes.  Using bank 
employees as a control group is not ideal, as they are not necessarily directly comparable to prize winners 
who were not employees
30
, but these are the only account-level data available to us which contain 
individuals that did not win prizes.  To estimate these regressions, for each month we include all bank 
employees who had an open account in a given month as well as all prize winners in that month, and then 
test whether prize winners had a higher propensity to have an open account six months or one year after 
that point in time.  In the regressions we include demographic controls as well as year-month fixed effects 
so that we are comparing employees and prize winners in the same months to each other.  In addition, it is 
critical to control for the MaMa balance prior to winning, since winning a prize is only random 
conditional on the amount held in the account.  We control for the MaMa balance prior to winning non-
parametrically by including dummies for each decile of the distribution.   
[TABLE VI] 
The main variables of interest in these regressions are dummies indicating the prize won by an 
account holder.  We split prize amounts into four categories: R1,000 to R19,999, R20,000 to R99,999, 
R100,000 to R 999,999, and R1,000,000.  We use these ranges because a few prize winners won multiple 
prizes in a given month, and hence there are a few cases in which the prize amount is not exactly R1,000, 
R20,000, R100,000, or R1 million.  However, the vast majority of winners in each category won only a 
single prize, and hence are exactly at the lower bound of that category. 
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 There were only 59 employees who also won prizes, out of a total of 4,965 total prizes awarded, so we lack 
sufficient sample size to limit to only employee winners.   
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We find that R1,000 prize winners are less likely than bank employees to keep their MaMa 
accounts open both six months and one year after winning.  Coefficients for R20,000 and R100,000 prize 
winners are also negative at both horizons, although statistical significance for these groups is only found 
for R100,000 prize winners at the 12-month horizon.
31
  However, the economic magnitudes of these 
estimates are not overly large.  We estimate that winners of the R1,000 prize are 4.2% less likely keep 
their account open one year after winning, a small reduction from the mean of 79.7%.  Even for R100,000 
prize winners, which are 13.7% less likely than non-winners to keep their account open for a year, the 
likelihood of keeping their account open remains well above 60%.  Meanwhile, we also find that winners 
of the grand prize are somewhat more likely to keep their account open six months after winning, but the 
effect is no longer statistically significant at the one-year horizon.  The fact that the finding reverses for 
the largest prize winners suggests that winning the jackpot could have some addictive aspect, or perhaps 
individuals feel that they have enough money that they can afford to gamble a bit.  Regardless, the 
estimated coefficients are again not large: R1 million prize winners are only 5.4% more likely to keep 
their account open for six months, and 4.1% more likely for a full year. 
In the last two columns of Table VI, we test whether prize winners keep more funds in their 
MaMa accounts after winning.  The dependent variable in these regressions is the MaMa account balance 
at the 6- or 12-month horizon, a figure which we winsorize at the 95
th
 percentile to avoid undue influence 
of outliers.
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  It should be noted that when prizes were awarded the amounts were automatically deposited 
into the winner’s MaMa account, so there is an immediate increase in a winner’s MaMa balance in the 
month following the win.  Thus, we are testing whether prize winners leave these amounts in their 
accounts or even increase their investment, or whether they take their winnings out of the accounts for 
other uses. 
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 Because there are substantially more R1,000 prize winners, estimates of these coefficients tend to be much more 
precise than estimates for other prize categories. 
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 We also obtain similar results if we use ln(MaMa Balance) as the dependent variable. 
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Across all levels of winnings, prize winners keep substantially more in their accounts than non-
winners, even a full year after the prize was awarded.  The magnitude of these effects is quite large: even 
winners of R1,000 held on average R5,842 more in their accounts six months after winning a prize.  It is 
notable that winners of R1,000 or R20,000 increase their PLS holdings by amounts larger than the prize 
awarded.  This suggests that the increased holdings reflect more than a pure wealth effect, at least for 
smaller prize winners.  Instead, this evidence is consistent with the idea that prize winning may add to the 
excitement of PLS and hence lead to increased demand. 
A year after winning, R100,000 and R1 million prize winners held on average about R20,000 
more in their accounts than non-winners, and amount roughly equivalent to increased holdings by winners 
of R20,000 prizes.  Thus, larger prizes did not lead to correspondingly larger demand for PLS, although 
an increase of R20,000 is still a large amount, relative to average (median) account balances of R17,800 
(R400).   
Finally, we check to see whether MaMa winners add "new" money into their account in the 
period after their prizes are awarded. Specifically, we determine the minimum balance in the six month 
period following the date on which they win a prize. We then compare the balance one year after the prize 
award date, relative to this minimum. One year after the prize is awarded, 68% of winners (1,670 out of 
2,439) have added net deposits to the account; 7% (170) have maintained the balance; and 24% (599) 
have made further net withdrawals. 
Taken together, these results show that, while prize winners were somewhat more likely to close 
their accounts after winning, overall prize-winning leads to significantly higher PLS demand. 
B. Effect of prize on other’s behavior 
Large prizes can also have an impact on the behavior of others.  In this section we test whether 
prize winners create a “buzz” at a particular bank branch, leading to increased demand for PLS at that 
branch relative to other bank branches.  To do this, we follow the methodology of Guryan & Kearney 
(2008), who find that in the week following the sale of a winning lottery ticket, lottery ticket sales at the 
winning store increase substantially relative to other sales locations.  Similarly, we look for a “lucky 
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stores” effect by testing whether bank branches where the jackpot winner holds an account experience 
excess demand for MaMa in the month following the win.  To do so, we estimate the following 
specification: 
                                                         
where   indexes bank branches,   indexes months,   indexes months since the drawing,           is 
the monthly log growth rate of MaMa balances at the branch,   is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
jackpot winner’s account was at branch  ,             is the natural log of total MaMa deposits held 
at the branch, and   is a fixed month effect.  With this setup,    is the estimated effect of having a R1 
million winner at the branch   months after the drawing relative to all other branches.  This specification 
is estimated once for each value of  .  It is crucial in these specifications to condition on the amount of 
MaMa deposits held at the branch, as each branch only has the same chance of having a jackpot winner 
conditional on the amount of MaMa deposits held at the branch that month.  In addition, when calculating 
the growth rate of MaMa balances we remove the jackpot winner’s account from the total balance since 
the winner receives R1 million in her account in the month following the win, which has a drastic impact 
on growth rates. 
 Panel A of Figure 6 plots estimates of    for values of   ranging from 3 months prior to the 
drawing to 3 months after, as well as 95% confidence intervals for the estimate.  As expected, coefficient 
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero for all months prior to the drawing, which verifies 
the identifying assumption that the assignment of the prize was truly random conditional on MaMa 
deposits held at the branch.  In the month following the drawing we find that MaMa deposits grow by an 
excess of 11.6% at the branch which had the winning MaMa account.  Note that this is a monthly growth 
rate.  Across the whole sample, the average monthly growth rate of MaMa balances was 13.3%, and so 
having a jackpot-winning account holder increases the growth rate of deposits by 87%.  However, the 
effect does not persist past one month.  In the following month, growth at the winning branch is again 
indistinguishable from that of other branches.  At the same time, the growth rate does not shrink below 
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that of non-winning branches, such that this one-time shock results in a permanent level change in the 
amount of MaMa deposits at the branch.
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[FIGURE 6] 
 In Panel B of Figure 6 we plot a similar picture except in this case the dependent variable in the 
regression is the change in the number of MaMa accounts in month  .  In this case, the estimated effect 
one month after the prize is not quite statistically significant (p-value=0.07), but the point estimate is 
similarly large.  Specifically, having a jackpot winner increases the number of new MaMa accounts at the 
winning branch by about 36 accounts, a 70.5% increase from the mean increase of 51 new accounts. 
 We also find evidence that a jackpot winner generates excess demand in non-MaMa savings 
deposits.  Panel C of Figure 6 shows that bank branches with jackpot winners have 4.2% higher growth in 
standard 32-day balances in the month following the win.  This suggests that the shock to demand in PLS 
can generate spillovers into standard savings products as well.
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Finally, we test whether there is a spillover effect to other nearby First National branches.  Here, 
we alter the definition of   such that it is a dummy equal to 1 if a branch within 10km (6.2 miles) has an 
account holder that wins the jackpot.  In these regressions we drop the winning branches from the sample, 
so as to focus entirely on estimating the spillover effect by itself.  Results are presented in Figure 6, Panel 
D.  We find weak evidence that branches experience excess MaMa deposit growth of about 1.7% in the 
month after a nearby branch has a jackpot-winning account.  This result is just outside of the range of 
statistical significance (p-value=0.056), which is perhaps unsurprising given that effect is an order of 
magnitude smaller. 
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 In unreported results, we also find that branches with a higher than expected number of prizes experience 
abnormally high growth in MaMa balances in the following month.  In addition, our results also hold if we change 
  to be a dummy equal to 1 if any large prize (i.e., greater than R1,000) was won by an account holder at a 
particular branch, although the estimated impact is smaller at 2.9% excess growth in MaMa balances. 
34
  While our data allow us to remove the MaMa balances of the jackpot winner in order to focus only on the non-
winners, we do not observe the standard 32-day savings balances of the winner.  Because of this, it is possible that 
some of the spillover effect to regular 32-day accounts is driven by winners transferring some of their winnings into 
regular savings accounts. 
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 Our results are consistent with the findings in Guryan & Kearney (2008), who also find strong 
same-store effects for selling a winning lottery ticket and much smaller spillover effects to other nearby 
stores.  In the context of prize-linked savings, our results show that prize-winning can indeed create a 
“buzz” that results in significant and permanent increases to savings held in the PLS product even by 
those who did not win a prize.  We also find increases in non-PLS savings at the winning branch.  In this 
way, the prizes themselves can act as a self-contained mechanism to generate savings, similar to the 
process modeled by Han and Hirshleifer (2013). 
VI. Conclusions  
The raw growth of the MaMa program confirms that, in South Africa at least, there was strong 
“unmet consumer demand…for saving products that offer the (remote) prospect of changing current 
wealth status, rather than incrementally building wealth with certainty” (Kearney et al. 2010).  By relating 
personal characteristics to PLS usage, we find that demand for MaMa came in particular from financially 
constrained individuals – consumers who reported feeling unable to repay their debt.  Relatedly, we find 
evidence that lower levels of optimism are also positively related to PLS demand.  These results are in 
line with the idea that the attraction of “winning big” is strongest for individuals who have the greatest 
desire to obtain a life-changing amount of money, such as low-wealth or depressed individuals.  Further, 
we did not find a relationship between financial knowledge and PLS take-up, suggesting that the 
relatively low observed levels of precautionary savings and high amounts spent on lottery gambling are 
not due to a lack of financial sophistication such as misunderstanding compound interest.  
Building on this, our evidence suggests that prize-linked savings increase net savings.  We do not 
see any evidence that the MaMa program cannibalized savings, and instead find the reverse: branches 
with higher MaMa usage also saw expansion of regular savings, and individuals who opened MaMa 
accounts typically increased their balances in standard savings accounts (although these relationships are 
not necessarily causal).  Meanwhile, demand for MaMa was highest when the jackpot of the National 
Lottery was lowest, suggesting that the two may be substitutes.   
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The welfare impact of PLS depends crucially on the relative benefits of consumption today versus 
savings for tomorrow.  By ruling out cannibalization of savings, our evidence shows that increased 
savings in PLS is likely to come at the expense of reduced consumption.  Some of that reduction comes 
from a decline in lottery expenditure (and in that sense can be seen as a shift in investment from the 
lottery to PLS), but our data do not allow us to pin down exactly how individuals adjust consumption in 
order to invest in PLS.   While other evidence suggests that there are potentially large benefits to 
increasing savings and that many individuals express a desire to save more (Lusardi, Schneider, and 
Tufano 2011; Dupas and Robinson 2013), the exact benefits of PLS must be weighed against a decrease 
in current consumption. 
 We also show that prize-winning has a material effect on the saving behavior of both the winner 
as well as those nearby.  Prize winners tend to increase balances held in PLS by substantial amounts, in 
some cases by even more than the amount of the prize won.  Further, large prizes create a local “buzz,” 
leading to dramatically increased demand for PLS at the winning branch in the month following the win. 
These findings are important for academic researchers seeking to understand saving and gambling 
behavior, as well as policy makers who are considering alternative policies geared toward increasing 
savings.  Prize-based incentives such as those offered in PLS products can successfully attract new savers 
and new savings, and would also likely decrease the amount of lottery gambling.  Our evidence shows 
that there is a potentially large group of consumers whose savings patterns might be enhanced if given a 
chance, however remote, of winning a life-altering prize.    
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FIGURE 1 
GROWTH OF THE MAMA PROGRAM 
Panel A shows the total number of standard 32-day notice accounts and MaMa prize-linked accounts at First 
National Bank from January 2003 – July 2008, while Panel B shows the total balances held in these accounts (in 
Rand billions).  In both charts, the vertical lines identify the beginning and end of the MaMa program, in January 
2005 and March 2008, respectively. 
Panel A: Total number of 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (thousands of accounts) 
 
 
Panel B: Total deposits in 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (Rand billions) 
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FIGURE 2 
SHARE OF DEPOSITS HELD IN STANDARD SAVINGS AND PLS, BY AGE AND INCOME 
Panel A of this figure displays share of total deposits held by individuals in different age brackets for both standard 
32-day and MaMa accounts.  Panel B shows the share of total balances held by individuals across income brackets.  
For reference, the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, and 95
th
 percentiles of income in South Africa in 2005 were R13,314, R26,559, 
R68,527, and R290,253, respectively.  Data reflect account balances as of June 2008, 3 months after the MaMa 
program ended. 
 
Panel A: Share of deposits held, by age bracket 
 
 
Panel B: Share of deposits held, by income bracket 
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FIGURE 3 
SHARE OF EMPLOYEES WITH STANDARD SAVINGS OR PLS ACCOUNTS, BY INCOME 
This figure plots the share of bank employees that have a standard savings account or MaMa account across ten 
income deciles.  Employees are classified as having a standard savings account if they have either a regular 32-day 
notice account or a money market account.  Income deciles divide the 38,262 employees into ten groups of 3,826 
employees each based on estimated income.   
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FIGURE 4 
GROWTH RATES OF STANDARD 32-DAY SAVINGS BEFORE AND AFTER MAMA 
This figure displays the average monthly growth rate of standard 32-day savings balances for two groups of First 
National’s branches.  Branches are divided based on their average monthly MaMa balance growth rate from Jan. 
2005 – Mar. 2008.  Those branches that had below-median MaMa growth are in the low MaMa growth group, while 
the remaining branches are placed in the high MaMa growth group.  The figure shows average growth rates of 
standard 32-day balances both before and after the MaMa program, with the vertical line denoting the start of the 
program.  While high MaMa growth branches averaged 0.57% higher 32-day savings growth than low MaMa 
growth branches prior to the introduction of the MaMa account, after this date the difference grew to an average of 
2.01%.  A t-test that the difference-in-differences is different from zero is significant at the 1% level. 
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FIGURE 5 
SAVINGS BALANCES OF BANK EMPLOYEES: MAMA USERS VS. NON-USERS 
This figure shows the evolution of savings balances for bank employees who opened MaMa accounts, as compared 
to employees who never used MaMa.  Each panel displays coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence bands for 
dummy variables in regressions that test whether MaMa users savings balances were significantly difference from 
those of non-users.  In both panels, the x-axis measures the number of months since opening MaMa, ranging from 1 
year prior to two years after opening the account, and the vertical line indicates the month in which a MaMa account 
was first opened.  Panel A shows evolution of total net savings balances, defined as the sum of all deposit accounts 
held by the employee in a given month.  Panel B examines balances of standard 32-day accounts by themselves, and 
checks whether employees decreased their regular savings balances when opening MaMa accounts.  Regressions are 
estimated by OLS, and exact specifications are described in detail in the text.  Confidence intervals are based on 
robust standard errors which are clustered at the individual employee level. 
Panel A: Evolution of net savings of MaMa users relative to non-users 
 
Panel B: Evolution of regular 32-day account balances of MaMa users relative to non-users 
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FIGURE 6 
EFFECT OF JACKPOT PRIZE WINNER ON LOCAL MAMA DEMAND 
This figure shows the impact of having a million-Rand prize winner on local MaMa demand.  Each panel displays 
coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence bands from seven separate regressions which test the lead and lag 
effect of a jackpot win.  Panel A shows the effect of having a million-Rand winner on the excess monthly growth 
rate of MaMa balances at the same branch, relative to all other bank branches.  Panels B and C are similar, except 
they show the impact of a jackpot win on the change in the number of MaMa accounts and the total standard 32-day 
deposits at the branch, respectively.  Panel D displays the spillover effect of a jackpot win on the growth rate of 
MaMa balances at branches that are within 10km of the winning branch.  Regressions are estimated by OLS, and 
exact specifications are described in detail in the text.  Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors 
which are clustered at the branch level. 
Panel A: Excess growth of total MaMa deposits at winning branch 
 
Panel B: Change in number of MaMa accounts at winning branch 
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FIGURE 6 - continued 
Panel C: Excess growth of total 32-day deposits at winning branch 
 
Panel D: Excess growth of total MaMa deposits at nearby branches  
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FIRST NATIONAL BANK DATA 
This table reports summary statistics for data obtained from First National Bank.  Panel A presents summary 
statistics on the total number of accounts and total deposits in standard 32-day and MaMa accounts at 604 bank 
branches as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended.  Panel B compares the share of balances owned by 
race and gender for 32-day and MaMa accounts.  Panel C contains account-level summary statistics for bank 
employees. 
 
Panel A: Branch-level summary statistics as of March 2008 
  Product N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
10th 
percentile Median 
90th 
percentile 
Total No. of Accounts 
32-day  604 1,097  1,064 148  826 2,273 
MaMa 604 1,863 2,505 211 1,408 3,797 
Total balance (Rand millions) 
32-day 604 R 7.81 R 8.08 R 0.89 R 5.29 R 18.00 
MaMa 604 R 2.35 R 3.25 R 0.23 R 1.70 R 5.00 
 
 
Panel B: Share of balances owned by race and gender 
  MaMa 32-day 
Race: 
     Black 0.45 0.45 
   White 0.37 0.41 
   Asian 0.09 0.07 
   Mixed race 0.08 0.07 
  
  
Males 0.52 0.46 
 
 
Panel C: Account-level summary statistics of bank employees as of March 2008 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
10
th
 
%tile Median 
90
th
 
%tile 
% with non-zero 
balance 
Jan. 
2005 
Mar. 
2008 
Total balance:         
   32-day saving 38,301 872 9,989 0 0 322 9.9% 15.4% 
   Money market 38,301 3,285 31,091 0 0 841 -- 22.9% 
   Checking 38,301 206 17,507 -5,833 0 2,703 39.0% 62.6% 
   MaMa 38,301 567 5,510 0 0 723 5.5% 45.5% 
   Combined 38,301 4,930 39,921 -5,065 0 10,043 41.4% 77.9% 
Income Estimate 38,301 175,920 203,408 60,000 112,297 360,000 -- -- 
Combined bal. (% income) 38,301 3.41 62.44 -4.4 0 6.9 -- -- 
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TABLE II 
FINSCOPE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table reports summary statistics of demographic characteristics derived from the FinScope 2005 survey.  Each 
item represents the mean or median of all survey respondents within 50km of each bank branch.  This table reports 
summary statistics across the distribution of the 531 branches which had any respondents within the 50km radius.  
Financial segmentation model (FSM) tier and FSM components are calculated by FinScope based on responses to a 
battery of questions.  Each respondent is segmented for each component separately on a scale from 1 to 8, and then 
the overall tier is a combination of those components (and also ranges from 1 to 8).  For all components a higher tier 
signifies more, e.g., higher financial penetration score signifies that an individual has adopted more financial 
products.  % can’t pay debt is the percentage of respondents within 50km of the branch who agreed with the 
statement “you never seem to be able to pay off your debt; your debt just keeps getting worse.”  % can’t pay debt 
(outliers removed) reports summary stats when branches above the 98
th
 percentile have been removed. 
 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
10th 
%tile Median 
90th 
%tile 
Demographics 
      Race: 
         Black 531 69.0% 26.3% 33.7% 72.3% 100.0% 
   White 531 15.2% 13.7% 0.0% 16.0% 25.6% 
   Asian 531 3.1% 7.2% 0.0% 1.0% 8.2% 
   Coloured 531 12.8% 22.4% 0.0% 4.1% 40.7% 
       % Male 531 48.7% 3.3% 47.1% 48.8% 50.5% 
% Married 531 42.4% 12.7% 29.0% 45.3% 50.9% 
Median Age 531 33.77 5.64 27 32 37 
Median Household Income (000s) 531 29.9 18.5 15.0 27.0 42.0 
% Rural 531 31.2% 33.9% 0.8% 14.7% 90.8% 
% with at least High School 
Education 531 39.6% 15.9% 16.3% 39.9% 55.8% 
% unemployed 531 25.3% 10.7% 16.3% 23.0% 39.0% 
Homeownership rate 531 74.4% 15.0% 64.8% 73.3% 93.5% 
       Financial Indicators 
      % Banked 531 50.7% 17.1% 27.7% 54.2% 67.6% 
FSM Tier 531 3.45 0.77 2.40 3.52 4.15 
FSM Components: 
         Financial Penetration 531 2.28 0.56 1.61 2.32 2.95 
   Financial Access 531 3.84 1.00 2.51 3.96 4.73 
   Financial Discipline 531 4.94 0.43 4.43 4.99 5.27 
   Financial Knowledge 531 3.47 0.60 2.61 3.52 4.08 
   Connectedness and Optimism 531 6.67 0.32 6.29 6.75 6.98 
% can’t pay debt 531 14.9% 9.8% 0.0% 14.4% 23.9% 
% can’t pay debt (outliers dropped) 522 14.3% 8.7% 0.0% 14.4% 23.8% 
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TABLE III 
BRANCH-LEVEL MAMA TAKE-UP AS A FUNCTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND FINANCIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the log total usage of MaMa in March 
2008 (at the close of the program) for each bank branch.  Panel A shows the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and MaMa usage, as measured both by log total MaMa deposits and by the log number of MaMa 
accounts.  Panel B adds financial characteristics to these demographic controls to test whether banking attitudes 
have an additional impact on MaMa usage.  To be concise, we present only results relating to log total MaMa 
deposits in Panel B, but similar results are found using log number of MaMa accounts.  Independent variables come 
from the FinScope 2005 survey, and are averages (or medians, if specified) for all respondents within a 50km radius 
of the bank branch.  FSM Tier is a classification created by FinScope which categorizes respondents by various 
financial segments, and is based on 5 separate components which are identified separately in Panel B.  See text for a 
complete explanation of how the FSM tiers were created.  The final column of Panel B removes branches above the 
98
th
 percentile of % can’t pay debt.  In all regressions we control for the size of the branch by including the log total 
amount of regular 32-day deposits as an independent variable.  Standard errors are clustered by 54 district 
municipalities, and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Demographic characteristics 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MaMa 
deposits) 
Ln(No. of 
MaMa accts.) 
Race (% Coloured omitted): 
     % Black -0.386 -0.553** 
 
(0.251) (0.217) 
   % White 0.011 -0.368 
 
(0.489) (0.495) 
   % Asian 0.849 1.337 
 
(0.868) (0.836) 
% Male 0.112 -0.025 
 
(0.722) (0.691) 
% Married -0.526* -0.575* 
 
(0.301) (0.319) 
Median Age -0.011* -0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
Median Household Income -0.008*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
% with at least High School education 0.614* 0.293 
 
(0.347) (0.361) 
Unemployment rate -0.552 -0.357 
 
(0.450) (0.428) 
Homeownership rate -0.564* -0.639** 
 
(0.308) (0.263) 
Rural Area -0.518*** -0.408** 
 
(0.179) (0.177) 
Ln(Regular savings demand) 0.816*** 0.891*** 
 
(0.035) (0.038) 
   Observations 531 531 
R-squared 0.754 0.737 
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TABLE III - continued 
 
 
Panel B: Financial characteristics 
 
  Full Sample   
Outliers 
removed 
Dependent variable: Ln(MaMa deposits) 
% banked -0.259 
     
 
(0.348) 
     FSM Tier 
 
-0.102 
    
  
(0.138) 
    FSM Components: 
         Financial Penetration 
  
-0.255 
   
   
(0.205) 
      Financial Access 
  
0.039 
   
   
(0.082) 
      Financial Discipline 
  
-0.071 
   
   
(0.105) 
      Financial Knowledge 
  
0.201 
   
   
(0.132) 
      Connectedness and Optimism 
  
-0.281** 
   
   
(0.117) 
   % can't pay off debt 
   
0.708 
 
1.634*** 
    
(0.489) 
 
(0.466) 
       Demographic controls Y Y Y Y 
 
Y 
       Observations 531 531 531 531 
 
522 
R-squared 0.755 0.755 0.762 0.757   0.761 
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TABLE IV 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MAMA TAKE-UP AMONG BANK STAFF 
This table presents estimates from OLS regressions run on the First National Bank staff dataset.  In each regression, 
the dependent variable equals one if the employee has a positive balance in a particular saving product at any time 
during the sample period (Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2008).  In Panel A we correlate demographic characteristics with the 
propensity to have either a standard 32-day savings account, a money market or standard 32-day account, or a 
MaMa account.  Ex-staff indicate employees whose employment terminated at some point during the sample period. 
In Panel B we test whether previous banking behavior is correlated with the propensity to open a MaMa account, 
after controlling for all demographic characteristics contained in Panel A. High and low savings before MaMa are 
dummy variables indicating employees with above- and below-median savings, respectively, as a percent of income 
prior to opening a MaMa account.  High and low borrowing before MaMa are defined similarly for net borrowers 
(and thus those with no accounts are the omitted group).  All regressions contain 34 bank region fixed effects 
(regions are defined internally by First National Bank).  Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are 
clustered at the region level.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Demographic characteristics 
Dependent Variable: 
Has 32-day 
Savings 
Account 
Has 32-day 
or MM 
account 
Has 
MaMa 
Account 
Age (<30 omitted): 
      30-39 -0.074*** -0.093*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 
   40+ -0.096*** -0.104*** 0.146*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.017) 
Income decile (1
st
 omitted):    
2
nd
 0.058*** 0.095*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
3
rd
 0.087*** 0.141*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) 
4
th
  0.106*** 0.148*** 0.190*** 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) 
5
th
 0.107*** 0.143*** 0.203*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) 
6
th
 0.082*** 0.129*** 0.182*** 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
7
th
 0.083*** 0.141*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
8
th
 0.058*** 0.126*** 0.174*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
9
th
 0.046*** 0.099*** 0.168*** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) 
10
th
 0.018 0.064*** 0.145*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) 
Male -0.061*** -0.088*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
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TABLE IV – continued 
Race (mixed race omitted): 
      Black 0.093*** 0.074*** -0.044*** 
 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
   White 0.003 0.022** -0.042*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
   Asian -0.012** -0.004 -0.044*** 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Ex-staff -0.018** -0.145*** -0.104*** 
 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.009) 
    Region Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
    Observations 38,262 38,262 38,262 
R-squared 0.036 0.055 0.046 
 
 
Panel B: Previous banking behavior 
 
Dependent Variable: Opened a MaMa Account 
No saving or checking acct. before opening MaMa 0.046** 
  
 
(0.022) 
  Had saving account before opening MaMa 
 
-0.122*** 
 
  
(0.008) 
 Had checking account before opening MaMa 
 
-0.019 
 
  
(0.021) 
 High savings before MaMa 
  
-0.012 
   
(0.025) 
Low savings before MaMa 
  
-0.124*** 
   
(0.026) 
Low borrowing before MaMa 
  
-0.051*** 
   
(0.017) 
High borrowing before MaMa 
  
0.054*** 
   
(0.019) 
    Demographic controls Y Y Y 
Region Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
    Observations 38,262 38,262 38,262 
R-squared 0.048 0.058 0.060 
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TABLE V 
BANK-WIDE MAMA GROWTH AND THE NATIONAL LOTTERY 
This table relates overall MaMa demand to the size of the jackpot available in the South Africa National Lottery.  
Each week, winning lotto numbers are drawn on Wednesday and Saturday.  For each regression, the dependent 
variable is an indicator of growth in MaMa usage over the 3-day period (M-W or Th-S) preceding the draw.  ln(New 
funds deposited) is the log of total Rand deposited in new accounts during the draw period , and # of new accts. 
opened is the total number of new MaMa accounts opened over the draw period.  Jackpot sizes were estimated and 
published by the National Lottery prior to the draw.  We non-parametrically divide jackpots into 4 quartiles, where 
the largest jackpots are typically due to rollovers or guaranteed prizes.  Both the contemporaneous jackpot and the 
lagged jackpot are included in the model.  Saturday indicates draws that were done on Saturday, and controls for 
time-of-week fixed effects.  Few business days controls for draw periods that covered less than 3 business days due 
to holidays.  Savings growth controls for the growth in regular 32-day deposit balances (1
st
 column) and accounts 
(2
nd
 column) at First National during the draw period.  To remove serial correlation, we include lagged values of the 
dependent variable.  In addition, 4 time fixed effects are included to control for different periods of the MaMa 
program: Jan-Sept. 2005, Oct. 2005-Jun. 2006, Jul. 2006-Mar. 2007, and the period after the lottery re-opened from 
Oct. 2007-Mar. 2008.  Newey-West standard errors that account for up to 2 weeks of remaining serial correlation are 
reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(New 
funds 
deposited) 
 
# of new 
accts. 
opened 
    Estimated Jackpot size (< R3 million omitted): 
      R3 million - R4 million -0.0118 
 
-89.98 
 
(0.0674) 
 
(141.3) 
   R4 million - R7 million -0.124*** 
 
-341.4*** 
 
(0.0456) 
 
(113.6) 
   > R7 million -0.151*** 
 
-269.0* 
 
(0.0574) 
 
(143.0) 
Last period jackpot: 
      R3 million - R4 million -0.147** 
 
-246.5 
 
(0.0606) 
 
(151.0) 
   R4 million - R7 million -0.107** 
 
-263.7* 
 
(0.0503) 
 
(134.4) 
   > R7 million -0.0494 
 
-233.5* 
 
(0.0608) 
 
(139.4) 
Saturday -0.0429 
 
58.67 
 
(0.0494) 
 
(94.52) 
Few Business days -0.394*** 
 
-1,162*** 
 
(0.0877) 
 
(170.4) 
Savings Growth (%) 2.563 
 
13,824** 
 
(2.532) 
 
(5,711) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.668*** 
 
0.686*** 
 
(0.0562) 
 
(0.0566) 
    
Time period fixed effects Y 
 
Y 
    Observations 276   276 
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TABLE VI 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MAMA DEMAND AFTER WINNING A PRIZE 
This table presents OLS regressions which test the effect of winning on MaMa account holders, as compared to bank 
staff.  Data is at the individual-month level.  In each regression, we control non-parametrically for the decile of 
MaMa balances 1 month prior to winning, as well as all demographic controls contained in Table IV, thus focusing 
only on the random event of winning a prize.  Prize-winners are included in each regression once, while each month 
of observation for bank staff is included in the sample if that employee has a MaMa account 6 months or 12 months 
prior to that month, such that all bank employees who had active accounts in the month of the win act as the control 
group.  The first two columns present results from linear probability models which test whether winning a prize 
affects one's propensity to continue to use a MaMa account 6 months or a year after winning.  The second two 
columns test whether winners have higher or lower balances in those accounts than bank employees who did not 
win.  All regressions include year-month fixed effects.  MaMa account balances used as dependent variables in the 
last two columns are winsorized at the 95
th
 percentile to avoid outlier bias.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, and are clustered at the individual level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Has MaMa Indicator MaMa Acct. Balance 
Snapshot - No. months after win: 6 12 6 12 
Prize Category 
       R1,000 to R19,999 -0.017** -0.042*** 5,842.63*** 4,071.15 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (2,176.12) (2,778.05) 
   R20,000 to R99,999 -0.021 -0.008 30,553.72*** 24,184.53*** 
 
(0.016) (0.022) (5,285.80) (5,454.80) 
   R100,000 to R999,999 -0.037 -0.137** 26,142.40*** 20,662.28*** 
 
(0.038) (0.065) (6,527.38) (7,866.34) 
   R1,000,000 0.054*** 0.041 100,586.04** 17,349.30 
 
(0.014) (0.042) (45,553.33) (10,560.09) 
     
Prior MaMa balance decile fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Demographic controls Y Y Y Y 
Year-Month Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y 
     Observations 439,152 323,714 439,152 323,714 
R-squared 0.152 0.150 0.317 0.189 
 
 
 
 
